About Indonesia "History"
History
For more
than three centuries most of the area now comprising Indonesia was ruled by the
Netherlands under a system designed to serve the economic needs of the
metropolitan power. Unlike the British in India or the United States in the
Philippines, the Dutch saw no need to bring significant numbers of Indonesians
into government or to start preparing them to manage their own affairs. The
1930 census, the last before Indonesia's independence, showed there were
208,269 Dutch living in Indonesia. They ran virtually everything, including
serving as postmen in the capital city of Batavia. M.C. Ricklefs in his study A
History of Modern Indonesia quotes Dutch governor-general B.C. de Jonge
(1931-36) as saying, "we have ruled here for 300 years with the whip and
the club, and we shall still be doing it for another 300 years." Education
for the local people was also not high on the Dutch agenda, with the result
that there were only a few hundred Indonesian college graduates out of a total
population estimated at 70 million at the time of independence. A large number
of those graduates were in politically acceptable fields such as medicine and
engineering. Economists, political scientists, and administrative specialists
were in very short supply.
From
Independence to the Soeharto Era
The result
was that Indonesians were poorly equipped to manage their own affairs, much
less to run a sophisticated democratic form of government when they achieved
independence. The institutions to support a democratic system were lacking, and
the Indonesians themselves had inherited from their Dutch and Japanese rulers
the traditions and legal structure of a highly authoritarian system. Moreover,
the bulk of the population was poor, illiterate, and used to paternalistic
rule, while those who were politically informed constituted a very thin layer
of urban society. Nonetheless the newly independent nation's rulers did better
than expected, and the commitment to the concept of democracy by the elite
resulted in the period 1950-57 being the freest and most open in Indonesia's
history. It was followed by two periods of authoritarianism: Sukarno's
"Guided Democracy" (1957-65) and Soeharto's "New Order"
(1966-98).
Indonesia
declared its independence on August 17, 1945. The following day the
revolutionary leaders promulgated what is now known as the 1945 constitution.
Modeled on the Chinese Organic Law of 1931, it is short (37 articles), vague,
and provides for a powerful president and a very weak legislature. It departs
in important ways from Western democratic concepts. With the achievement of
independence in December 1949, Indonesia's leaders promulgated a new basic
document--the 1950 constitution—that mandated a parliamentary system with a
largely ceremonial president, guaranteed human rights, placed the military
under civilian control, and provided checks and balances on the misuse of
power. Drafted by the Indonesians themselves, this constitution survived until
1959 when Sukarno unilaterally abrogated it, reimposed the 1945 constitution,
and formally proclaimed Guided Democracy.
The period
from December 1949 until July 1955 was tumultuous with monumental administrative
problems, outbreaks of dissent and violence in several parts of the
archipelago, and the coming and going of five cabinets. With the opposition
becoming increasingly vocal over the delay in holding national elections, it
was decided that polling for an elected parliament would take place in
September 1955 with elections for a Constituent Assembly to draft a new
constitution that December. The ensuring election campaign further aggravated
regional and intergroup frictions, and this is worth bearing in mind in case
history should repeat itself.
Interest in
the elections was high, and 91.5 percent of the eligible voters cast their
ballots. A total of 28 parties gained seats, but only 4 really counted. Those 4
shared roughly equally in about 75 percent of the vote. (see Table 1) Masyumi
(Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians)
was created by the Japanese in 1943 as a vehicle to control Islam, and it
included most Muslim educational and social organizations. It was banned by
Sukarno in 1960. Several present-day parties try to trace their lineage to
Masyumi. Nahdlatul Ulama (Awakening of Religious Teachers, NU) was established
in 1926 by the grandfather of the present NU leader, and the organization
continues today as the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia (estimated 30
million members). It is headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus
Dur, and is the patron of the present National Awakening Party (PKB). It is a conservative
rural organization with particular strength in East Java. The Indonesian
Nationalist Party (PNI) became the political vehicle of Sukarno. In 1973 it was
fused by Soeharto into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, a merger of the
Sukarno-era PNI with several Christian and other parties) and can now said to
be the political vehicle of Sukarno's daughter Megawati, leader of the present
Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P). The Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), at one time the third-largest communist party in the world, was
eliminated following the abortive 1965 coup.
The
parliamentary elections produced no solutions and only served to draw the
battle lines among various groups more sharply. The December elections for a
Constituent Assembly produced similar results. The assembly convened in
November 1956 and was dissolved by Sukarno three years later without having
drafted a constitution. Indonesians tend to view the period 1950-57 as one of
fast-changing, weak governments, divisive party politics, and administrative
chaos, as power shifted among the leading parties. Some outside observers are
now saying that things were not as bad as they seemed and that both Sukarno and
Soeharto, for their own purposes, denigrated the period of constitutional
democracy. There is undoubtedly some truth in this, but at the same time there
is little doubt that the period saw a sharpening of regional and intergroup
tensions and many basic economic and social problems were not addressed. Also
relevant is the fact that that there were four prime ministers during 1945-49
with governments changing on the average every 10.6 months; 1950-57 was a
little better with six prime ministers and an average term of 12.4 months.
Although the early 1950s were a time of political openness, there is no
gainsaying the fact that political instability during that time paved the way
for the succeeding authoritarian governments.
In March
1957, with serious disruptions in Sumatra and elsewhere, Sukarno proclaimed
martial law. This was followed on July 6, 1959, by the institution of Guided
Democracy, abolition of the Constituent Assembly, and restoration of the 1945
constitution by executive decree. In March the following year the elected
parliament was dissolved when it failed to pass the government's budget.
Thereafter Sukarno enacted budgets by decree as the economy descended into
total chaos. Indonesia's experiment with constitutional democracy had ended.
The New
Order
Soeharto
came to power in the wake of the 1965 coup attempt in which the top leadership
of the Indonesian army was murdered. As the ranking army officer left alive, he
gradually restored order, consolidated his position, and moved Sukarno off
center stage. In March 1966 he was given authority to exercise the powers of the
presidency and the following year he was elected acting president by the MPR.
His rule was to last for 32 years, and he became increasingly oppressive with
the passage of time.
At the
outset of his administration, Soeharto set two priorities: achieving stability
and promoting economic development. He brought into office a talented group of
U.S.-trained economists and received political advice from various sources,
including a Chinese-dominated think tank. Excellent progress was made in
straightening out the economic mess inherited from Sukarno (inflation at 600
percent, per capita GDP of $70, and an unpayable foreign debt). Initially his
administration was fairly open -- certainly more so than that of Sukarno. But
within a few years he became concerned that political party maneuvering, press
criticism, and friction among various societal groups would interfere with the
pace of economic growth.
Increasingly
he cracked down on dissent and circled the wagons around an ever smaller group
of family members and cronies, and his New Order government stifled expression
and demanded uniformity in a society that is far from uniform. Ten parties had
contested the 1971 parliamentary elections, the first held under Soeharto's New
Order. This included nine opposition parties left over from the Sukarno days
and a new government party called Golkar (the governing party; see discussion
below under The Party System). In 1973 Soeharto forced the nine opposition
parties to merge into two groups. Four Islamic-based parties were fused into
the United Development Party (PPP), and five secular parties were forced into
PDI. Golkar remained the government party, and it produced majorities for
Soeharto over the next 25 years ranging from 60 to nearly 75 percent. But in
actual fact, political parties were largely irrelevant. Even Golkar was kept on
a tight leash, and the other two were only symbolic with few real differences
in party platforms.
Soeharto's
suppression of expression and dissent was accepted during most of the New Order
in the face of impressive economic growth and improvements in living standards.
But by the 1990s people were becoming disillusioned with Soeharto and tired of
the state's growing oppression. Such a role by the government may have been
accepted by a largely rural, poorly educated population, but after 30 years of
economic growth Indonesian society was more urban, better educated, and more
sophisticated. According to the 1990 census, over 50 million people lived in
urban areas. The growth of an educated professional class led to demands for
more "openness," and this became the buzzword in political
discussion.
Indonesians
became increasingly outspoken against concentration of power at the top and
about the business activities of the Soeharto children, who, in the view of
many, acted like members of an imperial family. And Soeharto himself gave
evidence that he had changed--he no longer had his deft touch in dealing with
real or imagined rivals. His brutal removal of Megawati as head of PDI in 1996
and granting one of his sons a monopoly in producing Indonesia's "national
car" (a car that was actually made in South Korea) turned off many more of
those who had stuck with him up to that point because he produced results on
the economic front. The 1997 financial crisis, which hit Indonesia harder than
any other Asian country, sealed his fate, and he was forced by student
agitation, popular pressure, and defections among his senior cabinet members to
resign on May 21, 1998.
The Habibie
Administration
Soeharto's
choice of vice president in 1998 as he stood for his seventh five-year term was
B.J. Habibie, a German-trained aeronautical engineer who had served in the
cabinet since 1978 as minister for research and technology. A protégé and
longtime close associate of Soeharto, he was considered a poor choice by most
of those Indonesians calling for more political openness. When Soeharto made
his preference known in early 1998 the Indonesian rupiah, already under attack
as a result of the financial crisis, reached its lowest point of 17,000 to the
U.S. dollar. (In July 1997 it stood at 2,450 to the dollar.) One of the
U.S.-educated economic technocrats, former cabinet member Emil Salim, announced
that he would stand as a candidate against Habibie in the MPR elections. Salim knew
his candidacy was doomed, but he apparently wanted to establish the precedent
that the selection was not necessarily limited to Soeharto's choice. The
assembly ignored Salim and voted unanimously for Soeharto and Habibie to serve
from March 1998 until 2003. When Soeharto was forced to resign in May 1998,
only 72 days after election to his seventh term, Habibie was sworn in as
president in accordance with the constitution to serve out the remainder of
Soeharto's five-year term.
Though not
well equipped for the job by training or experience, Habibie has performed
considerably better than most would have expected under the very difficult
circumstances prevailing in Indonesia. Very early in his administration he
announced that he would not attempt to serve out the rest of Soeharto's term
but would move up parliamentary elections from 2002 and presidential elections
from 2003 to 1999. This significantly defused charges that his presidency was
not legitimate. He ended Soeharto's three-party system and opened the field,
with the result that nearly 150 parties were announced. This has been narrowed
to 48 by the government. He has also opened the possibility of wide-ranging
autonomy or independence for East Timor, freed many political detainees, lifted
restrictions on the media, and introduced some economic reforms, which, though
sorely needed, have angered some elements of the public.
The MPR was
called into session from November 11 to 13, 1998. In a session marred by
serious violence and the death of a number of students agitating for Habibie's
removal, the assembly took a number of important steps:
- Amended the MPR internal rules to, inter alia, permit elected representatives of new parties to sit in that body as well as in the parliament and separated the leadership of the two bodies (formerly it had been the same).
- Limited the president and vice president to a maximum of two five-year terms.
- Decreed that parliamentary elections should be held in May or June 1999, that all parties meeting the legal requirements would be able to compete, and that appointed militar representation in legislative bodies should gradually be reduced in accordance with a law to be enacted later.
Provided for the establishment of an independent
General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) to oversee the
elections.
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